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Abstract 15 
Pairwise contests are frequently disrupted by the intervention of third-party group members. 16 
However, little is known about whether an individual’s engagement in intervention behavior varies 17 
over time, or what factors might be associated with such variation. Using a hierarchical ‘hurdle’ 18 
model with two levels we investigated the conditions under which focal males: (i) would or would 19 
not engage in an intervention, and (ii) varied the number of interventions per day they engaged in. 20 
The lower level of the model showed that the proportion of unique opponents per day (estimated 21 
from the overall number of mature males in the herd) that focal males competed with, and the 22 
number of interventions suffered by a focal male were associated with an increased probability that 23 
this individual would itself engage in third-party intervention behavior. At the upper level of the 24 
model there was no association between these two variables and the rate at which individuals 25 
engaged in intervention behavior. The number of matings observed per day and aggression rate 26 
within the herd failed to contribute meaningfully to either level of the model. We also show that, 27 
although inconsistent over days and between years, some individuals displayed a greater propensity 28 
to intervene than others. The data from our study show that intervention behavior is more likely to 29 
occur as a results of individual directly experiencing aggressive behavior at a sufficiently high level, 30 
and not as a result of individuals monitoring aggressive or sexual activity in the wider social group. 31 
 32 
 33 
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A salient feature of group living behavior is that individuals will, to a greater or lesser extent, engage 37 
in aggressive acts with conspecifics as they seek access to valuable resources (Arnott & Elwood 38 
2008). Nevertheless, within social groups not all aggressive encounters adopt a pair-wise structure 39 
and, in many instances contests can involve triads of individuals. Specifically, an ongoing dyadic 40 
interaction can be disrupted by the engagement of a third individual (Jennings et al. 2009). These 41 
triadic interactions have been reported across a wide range of species, and thus appear to represent 42 
a general feature of agonistic behavior (e.g. baboon (Papio cynocephalus), Seyfarth 1976; bottlenose 43 
dolphin (Tursiops sp.), Connor et al. 1992; African wild dog (Lycaon pictus), de Villiers et al. 2003; 44 
rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta), Widdig et al. 2006; fallow deer (Dama dama), Jennings et al. 45 
2011; chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), von Rohr et al. 2012; raven (Corvus corax), Fraser & Bugnyar 46 
2012).  47 
 Consistent with the volume and complexity of the empirical data, models of intervention 48 
behavior have proposed a number of functions regarding triadic aggression. It has, for example, 49 
been argued that individuals intervene in dyadic contests to support kin (e.g. Engh et al. 2005), to 50 
combine fighting value (e.g. Noë & Sluijter 1995), to increase access to food (e.g. Vogel et al. 2007) 51 
or mating opportunities (e.g. Bissonnette et al. 2011; Young et al. 2014), and to increase or maintain 52 
dominance rank (e.g. de Villiers et al. 2003; Higham & Maestripieri 2010; Jennings et al. 2011, see 53 
Bissonnette et al. 2015 for a review). Accordingly, a central theme of theoretical approaches to 54 
intervention behavior is the association between the intervention and the intervening subject’s 55 
fitness (Dugatkin 1998a; Mesterton Gibbons et al. 2011; Bissonnette et al. 2015). Although the study 56 
of intervention behavior is now well established in the literature, there are still considerable gaps at 57 
the theoretical and empirical levels, and a number of questions remain to be addressed (see reviews 58 
in Mesterton-Gibbons et al. 2011; Bissonnette et al. 2015). For example, little is known about how 59 
individuals vary in their willingness to engage in intervention behavior over time, and what variables 60 
contribute to such variation (but see Silk 1993; Schülke et al. 2010). We sought to address these 61 
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questions by investigating third-party intervention behavior of male fallow deer during their annual 62 
rut. 63 
Male and female fallow deer tend to reside in sexually segregated social groups outside of 64 
the breeding season. Prior to the onset of the rut the bachelor herd disbands; males congregate on 65 
the female range where they become increasingly intolerant of the presence of rivals leading to a 66 
marked increase in aggression (Clutton-Brock et al. 1988). The majority of agonistic interactions are 67 
non-contact displacements; however, as the number of oestrus females increases during the rut 68 
there is an increase in fighting (Festa-Bianchet et al. 1990; Moore et al. 1995; Jennings et al. 2009, 69 
2013). The dominance hierarchy that is formed as a consequence of the outcome of these 70 
interactions is linear (Jennings et al. 2006, 2010), and mating success is highly skewed in favour of 71 
high ranking males (Moore et al. 1995). Although most fights tend to only involve pairs of males, 72 
approximately 10% of contests are disrupted by the approach and intervention of a third-party male 73 
(Jennings et al. 2009). There appear to be significant benefits accruing to males that intervene; they 74 
achieve an increase in dominance rank, are more likely to win subsequent contests and have greater 75 
mating success (Jennings et al. 2009, 2011). Nevertheless, these studies of intervention behavior 76 
focussed on the summed behavior and outcomes at the end of the rut for a limited sample of 77 
individuals. The rut is a complex and changing environment for males as they seek to outcompete 78 
rivals and attract females; given these challenges, it may be empirically and theoretically relevant to 79 
investigate variation in individual behavior and that of the wider social group in relation to 80 
intervention behavior.  81 
According to some models, changes in competitive ability (RHP, resource holding potential: 82 
Parker 1974) are likely to be important drivers of intervention behavior. They suggest that 83 
individuals strategically intervene against certain rivals in order to secure or advance their 84 
dominance rank (e.g. Dugatkin 1998a, see Bissonnette et al. 2015 for a review). During the rut, male 85 
physical condition declines; rutting males are inapt, losing up to a third of their body mass in 86 
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addition to acquiring and recovering from injuries they sustain from fighting (e.g. Jennings et al. 87 
2010). Thus, the RHP of individual group members is expected to change over time, and individuals 88 
should seek to update this RHP estimate through (aggressively) interacting with rival members of 89 
their group (Mesterton-Gibbons & Sherratt 2007). Accordingly, we test the idea that the proportion 90 
of unique opponents that individual males engage with on any given day in the rut will be associated 91 
with intervention behavior; specifically, we expect that as the proportion of unique opponents 92 
increases there will be an increased probability of engaging in intervention behavior.  93 
Although fallow deer that engage in intervention behavior hold high rank (Jennings et al. 94 
2009), it remains to be determined whether males that intervene selectively target low ranking 95 
males. In other words, is there a possibility that two sub-groups of males exist: one group that 96 
engages in intervention behavior and one that suffers from interventions. This is theoretically 97 
relevant, and certain models of intervention behavior suggest that this should be the case (e.g. 98 
Dugatkin 1998a). Therefore, engaging in intervention behavior and suffering from third-party 99 
interventions should be negatively associated; the present study tests this prediction.  100 
We have shown elsewhere that intervention rates, albeit summed over the entire rut, 101 
predict mating success (Jennings et al. 2011). However, the question as to whether the presence of 102 
the oestrus female encourages intervention behavior has not been examined. In general, female 103 
fallow deer are not promiscuous maters and only a low proportion of females mate more than once 104 
within a single oestrus cycle; therefore, we used the number of matings observed as an index of 105 
resource abundance. We predict that males are sensitive to resource abundance (Arnott & Elwood 106 
2008); therefore, as the number of matings increase we should see a corresponding increase in 107 
intervention behavior as individuals seek to maximise their access to reproductive opportunities (i.e. 108 
a direct benefits explanation, Smith et al. 2010). Alternatively, we note that rates of aggression 109 
fluctuate in relation to the number of matings (Jennings et al. 2006); therefore, intervention 110 
behavior could simply be mediated by opportunity to intervene, i.e. an increase in group-wide 111 
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aggression will coincidentally result in a greater number of potential targets and thus higher levels of 112 
intervention. Accordingly, we test the hypothesis that intervention behavior is associated with 113 
heightened levels of aggression within the social group.  114 
115 
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 116 
Methods 117 
Study site and population: The behavior of a herd of free-ranging European fallow deer in Phoenix 118 
Park, Dublin (Ireland) was investigated. The management plan for the herd involves tagging fawns 119 
shortly after birth during June-July with unique coloured and numbered ear tags. During this study 120 
there were approximately 394 and 349 females aged over one in either year. There are a number of 121 
different coat colours in the population, and mature males show distinct differences in antler size 122 
and shape; thus, we could identify individuals using a combination of coat colour, antler 123 
conformation and ear tag. 124 
 125 
Data collection 126 
We recorded aggressive behavior using all-event recording (Altmann 1974), and divided agonistic 127 
interactions into two categories depending on whether physical contact between the opponents was 128 
made: (i) non-contact interactions which involved the approach and displacement of an opponent, 129 
and (ii) fights where males locked antlers and engaged and took part in a vigorous pushing contest.  130 
In order to investigate the predictions of this study, the data were analysed using day as a factor 131 
from the 14th to the 31st of October, thus ensuring we covered the time period when all males were 132 
actively engaged in rutting. During this time-period we recorded 2645 (Mean = 146.9, SD = 55.1 per 133 
day; Range = 37-253) and 3462 (Mean = 192.33, SD = 86.5 per day; Range = 50-327) agonistic 134 
interactions in 1996 and 1997 respectively; there were 775 (29%) and 1076 (31%) fights recorded 135 
with the remaining interactions involving non-contact displacements. We also calculated the number 136 
of interventions of dyadic contests each day (i.e. the intervention rate per day), and the identities of 137 
the male that conducted the intervention and that of the competing males that suffered the 138 
intervention. The behavior of a combined total of 83 mature (4 yeas+) males were analysed in this 139 
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study (N = 69 and 67 males in 1996 and 1997 respectively with 53 males present in both years). 140 
Individual males were included dependent on whether they were present for 18 days of the study 141 
irrespective of whether or not they engaged in third-party intervention behavior. We note that a 142 
small number of males were excluded (N = 4 and 7 males respectively) from this study because they 143 
were only intermittently present, suffered severe injury (e.g. blinding) or died during the rut.  144 
With respect to the regressors used in the analysis, we used the number of different 145 
opponents (1996: range = 0 – 29 (0 – 39.7% of potential opponents); 1997: range = 0 – 18 (0 – 24.3% 146 
of potential opponents)) to calculate the proportion of unique opponents in the herd with which 147 
each individual interacted on each day. When third-party males approached and disrupted ongoing 148 
fights we recorded the number of times the focal male was subjected to an intervention. We also 149 
calculated the number of dyadic contests (non-contact interactions and fights) in the population on 150 
each day minus the number of contests for each male on that day; thus, the question as to whether 151 
intervention behavior is a consequence of variation in aggression rate over time within the 152 
population could be addressed. The number of matings was variable over days (1996: N= 315 153 
matings observed, Mean = 17.5, SD = 16.7, Range = 0 - 48 matings per day; 1997: N = 275, Mean = 154 
14.72, SD = 11.7, Range = 0 - 33 matings per day) permitting us to investigate whether variation in 155 
number of matings was associated with intervention behavior.  156 
Data analysis 157 
Three regressors (number of interventions suffered by the focal male, aggression rate in the 158 
population and number of matings per day) were log transformed prior to analysis to ensure that 159 
very large values were not overly influential. The fourth regressor, the proportion of unique 160 
opponents that the focal male interacted with per day, was subjected to an empirical logit 161 
transformation (log{(p+0.5/n)/(1-p+0.5/n)}) where the proportion is calculated as observing x 162 
(number of opponents) out of n (number of males in the herd) events, i.e. p = x/n). This transform 163 
was used to ensure that small or large values were not overly influential, and uses a correction term 164 
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0.5/n to remove the problem when transforming a zero response (no opponents recorded on a 165 
particular day). In addition to these four regressors, year and day were entered into the model as 166 
categorical variables. Three random effects were also entered into the model: individual identity, the 167 
interaction between individual and year, and the interaction between individual and day.  168 
Intervention behavior was analysed using Bayesian methods with Markov Chain Monte Carlo 169 
(MCMC) sampling. In order to sample the posterior distribution of the model’s parameters, we used 170 
the freely available JAGS software package (version 4.2, Plummer 2003) which was controlled from 171 
within the RunJags package (version 2.0.1-4, Denwood 2015) in R (version 3.1.3). We modelled the 172 
distribution of number of interventions across all mature males in the population per day including a 173 
substantial number of zero rated cells (see Figure 1) by using a hierarchical ‘hurdle’ model (e.g. Falk 174 
et al. 2015). This model has two levels in the hierarchy: the lower level focusses on the probability 175 
that an intervention takes place and the higher level models the number of interventions 176 
(conditional on an intervention taking place). Both levels of the model investigate the effects of the 177 
regressors on the observed outcomes; the first via a logistic regression and the second via a 178 
(truncated) Poisson regression (see supplementary materials for the model setup and code).  179 
 180 
Insert Figure 1 about here 181 
 182 
The hurdle model was run with an adaptive phase (including burn in) of 11,000 iterations 183 
over three parallel chains that employed dispersed initial values following which, a posterior phase 184 
consisting of 1,000,000 iterations was sampled. The posterior sample was thinned by taking every 185 
1000th iterate in order to reduce autocorrelation, and convergence in the model chains was 186 
assessed using the Gelman-Rubin statistic (Gelman & Rubin 1992). The parameters of the models 187 
were given a weakly informative prior with a half-t model in order to reduce influence on the 188 
posterior distribution and allowing the information in the data to dominate (Gelman et al. 2008). A 189 
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convergence level of <1.1 for each model parameter indicated that the adaptive phase of the model 190 
was sufficient (Kruschke 2015). This gave a posterior sample with an effective sample size of 1000 191 
for inference, that is, information corresponding to an un-autocorreleted sample of 1000 192 
observations. Inferences regarding the importance of each model parameter were made based on 193 
the posterior mean and the 95% credible confidence intervals. Following Bridger et al. (2015), where 194 
an individual parameter’s posterior mean effect was below 0.02 we determined that there was no 195 
evidence for a biologically meaningful effect.  196 
197 
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Results 198 
Inspection of the correlations in the posterior distribution revealed that generally the coefficients in 199 
the models were weakly correlated, with the strongest (positive) correlation between the 200 
coefficients for the proportion of unique opponents and interaction rate in the herd for the upper 201 
level Poisson model (see Table 1a and 1b). However this largest correlation was not sufficiently high 202 
to make the estimation procedure for the regressor coefficients unstable. 203 
 204 
Insert Table 1a and 1b about here 205 
 206 
The estimates relating to each regressor for both levels of the model are shown in Figures 2a and 2b. 207 
With respect to the lower logistic level of the model (Figure 2a) regressors relating to the individual’s 208 
day-to-day agonistic behavior - the proportion of unique opponents, and the rate at which the focal 209 
individual suffered third-party interventions were associated with an increased probability that this 210 
individual would itself engage in third-party intervention behavior. There was no meaningful 211 
association between intervention behavior and either the number of aggressive contests in the herd 212 
or the number of daily matings. The random effects component of the model showed that individual 213 
identity contributed meaningfully to intervention behavior; moreover, there was also a meaningful 214 
interaction between both year and day indicating that intervention behavior at the level of the 215 
individual was highly variable over days in the rut and between years.  216 
The upper (truncated Poisson) level of the model showed that there was no meaningful 217 
association between the model regressors and the rate of intervention behavior (Figure 2b). An 218 
examination of the effect of both day and year on intervention behavior for the logistic level showed 219 
a meaningful effect for one day early in the second rut (see supplementary file). There was no 220 
meaningful effect of day or year for the Poisson level (see supplementary file: Figure 3a and 3b).  221 
 222 
Insert Figure 2a and 2b about here223 
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Discussion 224 
 225 
Theory has stressed the importance of intervention behavior in relation to fitness benefits that 226 
accrue to the individual (see Smith et al. 2010 for a review), and empirical studies have shown that 227 
engagement in third-party interventions can be beneficial for the intervener (de Villiers et al. 2003; 228 
Engh et al. 2005; Flack et al. 2006; Jennings et al. 2011). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the 229 
study of triadic relationships have tended to omit potentially important information (Bissonnette et 230 
al. 2015). To the best of our knowledge few studies have studied variation in intervention behavior 231 
(but see Silk 1993 for rank related change). Therefore, we tested a number of predictions in relation 232 
to day-to-day variation in intervention behavior in a herd of fallow deer during their annual rut. This 233 
study shows that daily variation in the proportion of unique opponents and the number of 234 
interventions suffered by the focal male was associated with the occurrence but not the number of 235 
interventions engaged in. Conversely, daily variation in group-wide aggression rate and the number 236 
of matings in the herd were not associated with the occurrence or number of interventions.  237 
Third-party disruption of ongoing fights may be a strategy used by high-ranking individuals 238 
to prevent subordinates from advancing in the hierarchy (Dugatkin 1998a). One interpretation of 239 
this theoretical approach suggests that individuals fall within two groups: those that intervene and 240 
those that suffer intervention. However, intervention behavior in this population is associated with 241 
an increase in dominance rank early in the rut (Jennings et al. 2011), indicating that intervention 242 
behavior is a bottom-up process (Dugatkin 1998 a,b; Bissonnette et al. 2015). Moreover, individuals 243 
that intervene tend to also hold a higher rank than individuals that did not (Jennings et al. 2009). 244 
Thus, intervention behavior might be used strategically by (already) high ranking individuals to edge 245 
themselves higher in the hierarchy suggesting that intervention and suffering intervention might 246 
represent an inter-related strategy. The present study confirms this: where focal males suffered an 247 
intervention of their own contests, they were also highly likely to engage in third-party interventions 248 
themselves. Such a strategy might be expected in large and highly competitive systems such as ours 249 
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where rank is associated with mating success, and where mating success is highly skewed in favour 250 
of a small number of males (Moore et al. 1995). In short, intervention against a rivals of similar RHP 251 
would be strategically more beneficial than intervention against rivals of low RHP; whereas the 252 
former would be a threat if they achieved a winner effect, the latter would not.  253 
In large and highly competitive populations we expect individual RHP to decline over time 254 
(e.g. Clutton Brock & Albon 1979; Jennings et al. 2010). We also note that there is little evidence to 255 
support choice of specific opponents based on rank, age or other RHP correlates such as body and 256 
weapon size and this is expected where RHP changes over time (Jennings et al. 2006). Therefore, if 257 
intervention to maximise individual fitness (e.g. Dugatkin 1998a), those individuals may benefit from 258 
an estimate of RHP based on current opponent quality (Mesterton-Gibbons & Sherratt 2007). Given 259 
this we might expect individuals to sample the competitive quality of a range of rivals and use this 260 
update to inform intervention behavior. Our results support this prediction. We show that the 261 
occurrence, although not the number of interventions, is associated with daily variation in the 262 
proportion of unique opponents. Our analytic approach also afforded us the opportunity to address 263 
the behavior of individual males over the rut. This showed a meaningful effect of identity; moreover, 264 
there was also an interaction between identity and both day and year indicating that intervention 265 
was highly variable between and within individuals. Taken together, this suggests that intervention 266 
behavior is driven by a complex interplay between dyadic and triadic aggression and individual 267 
factors. 268 
Group members at the top of the hierarchy more often than not gain priority access to 269 
resources at the expense of individuals lower down in the dominance order (e.g. Englehardt et al. 270 
2006; Holekamp et al. 1996; Moore et al. 1995; Stahl et al. 2001). Intervention models anticipate 271 
that individuals strategically engage in intervention behavior in order to enhance or retain access to 272 
resources (Smith et al. 2010; Bissonnette et al. 2015), and there is evidence that intervention 273 
behavior is associated with reproductive success (e.g. Gilby et al. 2013). Therefore, individuals 274 
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should be sensitive to changes in resource availability; for example, as matings increase in frequency 275 
during the rut there is generally also an increase in fighting (e.g. Clutton-Brock et al. 1979; Moore et 276 
al. 1995). However, although intervention behavior is associated with mating success in fallow deer 277 
(Jennings et al. 2011), variation in the number of matings within the herd over the course of the rut 278 
was not. Thus, while males gain appreciably by engaging in intervention behavior, they do not alter 279 
strategic decisions concerning how they engage with rivals (i.e. dyadic versus triadic interactions) 280 
based on the distribution of matings.  281 
This latter point is supported by our analysis of group-wide aggression. We tested the 282 
hypothesis that intervention behavior may be an opportunistic response to a rise in the rate of 283 
contest behavior in the social group (e.g. von Rohr et al. 2012 and references therein). In this 284 
population the number of aggressive interactions between males increases in response to the 285 
number of matings (e.g. Moore et al. 1995; Jennings et al. 2006). However, there was no association 286 
between dyadic aggression in the herd and the propensity for individual males to engage in 287 
intervention behavior. Therefore, we find little evidence to support the idea that individuals monitor 288 
either changes in the level of aggression or mating opportunities in the social group.  289 
We attempted to determine what factors might be associated with individual variation in 290 
intervention behavior. To do so we examined a number of variables attributable to aggressive 291 
behavior experienced directly by the individual, that of the wider herd and the distribution of 292 
matings over time. Our results show that it is daily variation in aggression that is associated with 293 
intervention behavior: an increase (proportionally) in the number of unique opponents and the 294 
number of interventions suffered was associated with a greater probability that males would 295 
intervene. We found no effect of variation in matings within the herd; therefore, we fail to support 296 
those models that emphasise resource access as factor in intervention behavior. Our results re-297 
emphasise the complexity of intervention behavior (Bissonnette et al. 2015). This is underlined by 298 
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our failure to account for variation in the number of interventions over time - an issue that will need 299 
to be addressed in future studies.    300 
 301 
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 428 
Table 1a. Correlations between the coefficients of the four regressors entered into the lower 429 
(logistic) level of the statistical model.  430 
 Interventions 
suffered 
Interactions 
in herd 
Matings 
Proportion of 
Opponents 
0.17 0.08 -0.10 
Interventions suffered  0.03 -0.01 
Interactions in herd   -0.39 
 431 
Table 1b. Correlations between the coefficients of the four regressors entered into the upper 432 
(truncated Poisson) level of statistical model. 433 
 Interventions 
suffered 
Interactions 
in herd 
Matings 
Proportion of 
Opponents 
-0.04 0.66 -0.12 
Interventions suffered  0.04 -0.01 
Interactions in herd   -0.19 
 434 
 435 
436 
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List of Figures 437 
 438 
Figure 1. A count of the number of third-party interventions performed by males per day over two 439 
consecutive ruts (N = 301 interventions recorded within the sample period, October 14th – 31st).  440 
 441 
 442 
Figure 2a. Summary of the parameter posterior distributions showing the association between 443 
daily variation in the occurrence of intervention behavior and the four regressors for 444 
the logistic model. For each parameter the mean is denoted by the black square and 445 
the 95% credible intervals by the thin line. 446 
 447 
Figure 2b. Summary of the parameter posterior distributions showing the association between 448 
daily variation in the rate of intervention behavior and the four regressors for the 449 
Poisson model. For each parameter the mean is denoted by the black square and the 450 
95% credible intervals by the thin line. 451 
452 
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